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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIS C. GABBARD, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
DAVID A. BEACH, Bureau Chief, 
Driver License Services, 
Defendant/Respondent, 
Case No. 20750 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an Order issued by the Honorable 
Leonard H, Russon sustaining an order of driver's license 
suspension issued by respondent. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
By Order dated July 1, 19 85, following review of the 
file and hearing arguments of counsel, the court below ruled that 
the Order of Suspension issued by respondent under date of March 
18, 1985 was supported by substantial and competent evidence and 
therefor sustained the said order. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the Order of the District 
Court with instructions on remand to order respondent to reinstate 
appellant's driving privileges. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Is an order of suspension of driver's license 
which pre-dates the driver's license suspension hearing a denial 
of due process on its face? 
2. Where a statute mandates that the standards of the 
Commissioner of Public Safety be followed in the administration 
of chemical testing for breath/blood alcohol, is it a foundational 
requirement to provide evidence that said standards were followed 
in order to properly admit the results of said test? 
3. Is the order of suspension arbitrary and capricious 
where chemical test results are admitted absent a showing of 
compliance with the commissioner's standards? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 21, 1985, appellant was arrested for driving 
under the influence of alcohol (DUI) in violation of Section 
41-6-44, Utah Code Ann. The arresting officer served appellant 
with a notice of intention to suspend his driver's license 
pursuant to 41-2-19.6. That notice informed the appellant 
he had ten days to request a hearing before the "department." 
(Respondent),(Exhibit A). 
Appellant timely requested a hearing which was 
scheduled for March 22, 1985. At the hearing testimony was 
-2-
taken from Deputies Beam and Dial of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's 
Office and certain documents were admitted as evidence. (A 
transcript of the hearing is attached as Exhibit B). 
Sometime in early April, 198 5, appellant received an 
Order of Suspension dated March 18, 1985, signed by respondent, 
notifying him that his driver's license was suspended for 90 days 
(Exhibit C). 
On April 8, 1985 appellant filed a Petition for Hearing 
in the Third District Court oursuant to 41-2-20, Utah Code Ann., 
requesting the court to review the decision of respondent and 
vacate the said order of suspension. 
The matter came on for hearing before the Honorable 
Leonard H. Russon on May 21, 19 85. After hearing argument of 
counsel and reviewing the file, the court issued a Memorandum 
Decision, same date (Exhibit D). Having failed to rule on 
appellant1s first issue (order pre-dating the hearing), the 
court issued a supplemental opinion denying appellant's claim. 
On July 1, 1985 the Court signed its Findings of 
Fact and Conslusions of Law and Order from which this appeal 
lies (Exhibit E). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I of this brief will argue that respondent failed 
to comply with the statutory requirements of 41-2-19.6 and with 
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common law and constitutional requirements of due process in 
issuing its suspension order prior to the hearing on the same 
matter. 
Point II will argue that the respondent's hearing 
officer admitted chemical breath test results without sufficient 
foundation and in violation of 41-6-44.3. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING 
RESPONDENT'S ORDER OF SUSPENSION WHERE 
APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WAS 
PRIMA FACIE VIOLATED 
Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah, 
The Fifth Admendment to the United States Constitution and 
multitudes of cases interpreting the same leave no doubt that 
persons involved in the administrative process are entitled to 
the due process of law prior to any deprivation of life, liberty 
or property. "Property" and "liberty" have been extended to 
include "privileges." (Cf 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the abundant case 
law defining the scope of due process under that act). 
Furthermore, where certain rights, obligations or 
expectations are set forth in statutes, ordinances, rules, 
policies and the like, persons who's conduct is regula-ced 
thereby can achieve a property right status or an expectation 
akin to contract in reliance thereon. The U.S. Supreme Court 
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has gone so far as to hold that where a state grants written 
procedural rights to convicts which aren't even constitutionally 
required, that state is bound by it's own written rules and must 
afford those rights it has created. (Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 
539 (1974)). 
In 41-2-19.6 the State of Utah legislated that when 
police officers make DUI arrests they seize the arrestees 
driver's license, serve him notice of the State's intent to 
suspend his license after 31 days unless he requests a hearing 
to oppose the said suspension and if said hearing is requested, 
he is afforded a right to said hearing. All these things were 
done in the instant case. 
The salient issue deals with 41-2-19.6(5). "After the 
hearing, the department shall order (suspension or no suspension)." 
(Emphasis added). This section presumes that a fair and impartial 
hearing will determine the efficacy of the arresting officer's 
"interim" suspension based upon competent and substantial evidence. 
The burden of proof which the state is required to meet in driver's 
license hearings concerning DUI suspensions and revocations is a 
"preponderance of evidence." Murray v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983). 
In this case the hearing to determine whether or not to 
suspend was held four days after the Order of Suspension was dated. 
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The respondent will argue the need to have the order 
ready "just in case" is a computerized ""bureaucratic necessity to 
efficiently manage the driver's license system. Appellant presumes 
that this court would take a dim view of criminal trial judges 
preparing, signing and issuing judgments and verdicts of guilt 
before the trial of the accused actually occurs. 
The action of the respondent shows a predisposition to 
place the burden of proof on the appellant. The order in this 
case was issued prior to the statutorily mandated 31-day period 
expired and must therefor be considered void ab initio by this 
court. 
POINT II: THE COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING 
RESPONDENT'S ORDER OF SUSPENSION WHERE 
SAID ORDER WAS BASED ON INADMISSABLE 
EVIDENCE 
It is the policy of the driver's license hearing officers", 
except in rare circumstances, to avoid suspensions of license absent 
a valid, admissable breath test. Respondent will not argue with 
that assertion. Therefore, the breath test results in this case 
are critical. 
It is statutorily mandated at 41-6-44.3(1), Utah Code Ann., 
that the Commissioner of Public Safety establish standards for 
breath testing by police officers. Those standards are public 
record in the State Archives. 
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It is also statutorily required that before documents 
purporting to prove breath test results may be admitted in 
evidence, the proponent must provide the foundation that the 
"analysis was made and the instrument used was accurate, 
according to standards established in (41-6-44.3(1))..." The 
judge may find the results trustworthy only if "subsection (2) 
is satisfied (emphasis added). 
Ergo, the proponent must introduce the written standards 
and provide evidence that those standards were complied with in 
the analysis stage and in the interpretation stage. 
In this case the appellant not only objected to the 
admission of the breath testing documents because respondent 
failed to offer the commissioner's standards and could not 
therefore provide sufficient foundation, (Exhibit B, pages 11 
and 12); appellant asked the police officer on cross-examination 
if he was familiar with those standards and he replied that he 
had never seen them (Exhibit B, page 9). 
Since the hearing officer did not have the standards 
before him as an exhibit and his witness could not provide the 
foundational testimony, the admission of the testing documents 
was totally without foundation and the decision based thereon 
was arbitrary and capricious and should not have been sustained 
by the court. 
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The respondent will claim that the hearing officer 
found that all "procedures and requirements" were met. Who's 
requirements? Respondent cannot point to a single part of the 
record that shows compliance with the "commissioner's standards". 
It is not the officer's standards, the department's standards or 
the policeman's standards that are material or statutorily 
sufficient. 
This must be reversed and remanded and the order of 
suspension must be vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in appellant's arguments, 
both on statutory as well as constitutional grounds, the court 
should reverse the decision of the court below and remand this 
matter with instruction to vacate the Order of Suspension 
issued by respondent herein. 
RESPECTUFLLY SUBMITTED this/^_J>_day of August, 1985. 
LONI F. DeLAND 
McRAE & DeLAND 
Attorneys for Appellant 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
(801)364-1333 
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MAILED, postage prepaid, four copies of the foregoing 
Appellant's Brief to Bruce Hale, Assistant Attorney General, 
236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 this >9 < T daY 
of August, 1985. 
LONI F. DeLAND 
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SUMMONS AND CHATION 
3 COUNTY OF. 
3 CITY OF 
STATE-OF UTAH, 
 F — ^ ' 7 i%.A * 
THE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY 
GIVEN NOTICE TO APPEAR IN 
:OUAT OF €vj:r 
^ ^
 AT 383^Su).)o^St 
3)u^()r 6.^85" 0330 
ot less man (5) "or more than (14) fourteen days a»ter issuance of 
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"ENFORCEMENT E X H I B I T A 
AGENCY 
NO ^ 37472 
NAME >.
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^Po7 S 3^>o cO i7c. (State) ur Driver License No 
38128)1 $rr> 
Licens^-Ciass 
Weight 
/ 7 3 kP\*£. \(W F 
Expires State 
0/ 
Restriction Code 
Vehicle .License No 
yent ie Make Ty^hicie Tyoa Vehicle Year LCp'cx Accident 
DOB 
W*7 
Motorcycle 
Yes No 
State 
UT 
Expires 
Oirecupn ol Travel 
/ O j > S E W 
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT IS CHARGED WITH VIOLATING 
^ U T A H CODEgCOUNTY CODE CpTY CODE NO . 
ON THE CX / DAY OF ' *~ O 19 0 - > MILITARY TIME. J23*S~ 
LOCATION MILE POST NO 
VIOLATION(S) Dux 
WITHOUT ADMR=FrN£ GUILT I PR0Mjf6E TO APPEAR AS DIRECTED HEREIN 
SIGNATURE 
I CERTIFY THAT COPY OF THIS SUMMONS AND CITATION. WAS DULY SERVED UPON THE DEFENDANT ACCORD 
ING TO LAW ON THE ABOVE DATE AND I KNOW OR BELIEVE AND SO ALLEGE THAT THE ABOVE NAMED DEFEN 
DANT DID COMMIT THE OFFENSE HEREIN SET FORTH CONTRARY TO LAW I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT THE 
COURT TO WHICH THE DEFENDANT HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO APPEAR IS PROPER COURT PURSUANT TO SEC 
TION 77 7 19 
OFFICER ^ BADGE NO 
COMPLAINANT 
PERSE 
DATE OF CITATION— 
OFFICE OF DRIVER LICENSE SERVICES 
DATE SENT TO ODLS DOCKET NO 
ftB 2 5 1985 
READ CAREFULLY 
(tl('d 
SURR. Li 
This c i tat ion is not an information and wil l not be used as an informat ion without your consent. If an information 
is fi led you will be provided a copy by the court. You MUST appear in court on or before the t ime set in this c i tat ion. 
IF YOU FAIL TO APPEAR AN INFORMATION WILL BE FILED AND THE COURT MAY ISSUE A WARRANT FOR YOUR 
ARREST. 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUSPEND: You are hereby noti f ied that thirty-one(31) days from the date of this notice 
your privilege to operate motor vehicles in the State of Utah wil l be suspended pursuant toSection41-2-19.6U.C A. 
for a period of ninety (90) days thereafter, or for a period of one hundred twenty (120) days if this is the second 
occurrence of this offense.You are required by law to surrender to a peace off icer all Utah l icensesor permits in 
your possession. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO REQUEST A HEARING ON THIS SUSPENSION. The department wil l NOT 
contact you further regarding a hearing unless you request a hearing in wri t ing. Your WRITTEN REQUEST must 
be sent WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS of the date of arrest to the Off ice of Driver License Services at 4501 South 2700 
West, Salt Lake City, Utah 84119. Upon your written request for a hearing you wil l be not i f ied of a t ime and place 
to appear. If you fail to appear or request a hearing your driver l icense suspension wil l be automatic. The ad-
ministrative hearing is civil in nature and does not satisfy the requirement for you to appear in court as indicated 
above. 
TEMPORARY DRIVER LICENSE: This entire information ^  is VALID as a temporary driver l icense for a period of 
thirty (30) days from the date of this not ice 7] is NOT VALID as a temporary driver l icense. 
Reason for not issuing temporary l icense: 
) l 1101 
RECEIVED BY 
DRIVER LICENSE FEB 25198$ 
EXHIBIT B 
Transcription of Official Tape 
of the Hearing 
iMarch 22, 1985 
H.O.: Dennis Hicks 
Att.: Lonnie F. Deland 
Driver: Willis C. Gabbard 
DL #3842817 
DOB: 7-9-39 
H.O.: This administrative suspension hearing is being conducted at the 
request of Willis C. Gabbard, 10955 South 1300 West, South 
Jordan, Utah. Mr. Gabbardfs date of birth is 7-9-39. Driver 
License Number is 3842817 and today's date is Friday, March 22, 
1985. Present for the hearing are Dennis H. Hicks, the hearing 
officer; arresting officer is Deputy Beam of the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Office; and, ah, we also have a witness, Wayne Dial of 
the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office; Attorney of record is 
Lonnie F. Deland. Mr. Gabbard is not present for the hearing. 
Lonnie, is he going to come in? 
Att.: No. 
H.O.: Mr. Gabbard will not be present for the hearing but he is 
represented by Counsel. Again, the hearing is being conducted at 
the driver's request. Formal rules of evidence and procedure 
shall not strictly apply. However, as the hearing officer I will 
take sworn testimony and I'll consider all relevant evidence. If 
Mr. Gabbard's privilege to drive is suspended, he does have the 
right to petition a court of record in the county in which he 
resides within 30 days after the effective date of such 
suspension for judicial review by that court. So those 
testifying will be sworn and we will begin with the hearing. So, 
Officer: 
H.O.: 
Witness: 
H.O.: 
Att. : 
ah, Deputy Beam, would you please raise your right hand? Do you 
swear any testimony you may give during the course of the hearing 
to be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so 
help you, God? 
I do. 
Thank you. Deputy Dial, would you please raise your right hand? 
Do you swear any testimony you may give during the course of the 
hearing to be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth, so help you, God? 
I do. 
Thanks. I have in receipt from the Salt Lake County Sheriff!s 
Office several documents I'd like to identify for the record. 
Documents will be taken into consideration. First of all, we 
have a copy of a DUI summons and citation indicates to me that 
Willis C. Gabbard, 7-9 of 39 was arrested February 21, 1985. 
Military time indicated is 2325. Charged with driving under the 
influence by Deputy Beam of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's 
Office. Attached to that we have what appears to me to be the 
original DUI report form filled out in conjunction with the same 
arrest. Report form has been signed, the signature has been 
notarized and there is an authorized endorsing signature. We 
have also copies, photostat copies, intoxilyzer operational check 
list, and test record. Indicates the machine location is 4474 
South Main, which I believe to be the traffic division in Salt 
Lake County Sheriff's Office. Ah, it indicates on both the test 
record and the check list that the subject is Willis C. Gabbard 
and the date is 2-21-85. The operator is Deputy Dial. 
What does your record show? My copy doesn't — 24 at calibration 
H.O.: 
Att.: 
H.O.: 
Officer: 
• • • 
? 
? 
? 
? 
H.O.: 
? 
H.O.: 
Att.: 
H.O.: 
Att.: 
H.O.: 
Officer: 
H.O.: 
(inaudible conversation between two individuals) 
Okay, you're looking on the test record. 
Uh-huh. 
Okay. Correct, two four. From our records I would like to also 
add copies of the intoxilyzer test record. Have your still got 
them? 
I got copies. 
(Further inaudible conversation) 
You showed it to me. 
(Further inaudible conversation) 
You can search roe before I leave. (Laughter) 
What is it you're looking for? An original copy? 
The intoxilyzer service affidavit. Ah, for the record I have one 
right here. 
Ah ha, search him (Laughter) 
I have one from February 13th and I have one from March 2nd, a 
before and an after, done by the technician of the Sheriff's 
Office, Stan Jensen. Ah, same location, same serial number, 
984001121 and those will also be taken into consideration. 
(inaudible) inspect them now or later? 
Ah, which ever. 
I'll save everything until the end. 
All right. (Laughter) Deputy Beam, can you identify the DUI 
report form as the original you filled out in conjunction with 
the arrest of Mr. Gabbard? 
Yeah, that's my writing, my signature. 
Okay. On the back, ah, you've indicated that that is your 
signature, correct? 
Officer: Yes, it is. 
H.O.: Did you sign in front of a notary? 
Officer: Yes, I did. 
H.O.: Indicated here? 
Officer: Uh-huh. 
H.O.: Did you swear before that notary that the contents of this report 
were all true and correct to the best of your knowledge? 
Officer: Yes, I did. 
H.O.: Is there any part of this report that you did not fill out 
yourself other than the authorized endorsing signature and the 
notary public? 
Officer: It's all filled out by me. 
H.O.: Can you describe to me what you did when you had that document 
notarized? 
Officer: Ah, I contacted the field commander who is the notary, raised my 
right hand. I don't remember — • he asked me if the contents of 
this report were true to the best of my knowledge. I don't 
remember exactly what he said and I said "I do" and he signed it 
and notarized it. 
H.O.: Thank you. According to the report form you observed Mr. Gabbard 
in actual physical control of a vehicle and after coming in 
contact with Mr. Gabbard, ah, for — • you were under the 
suspicion that Mr. Gabbard could be under the influence of 
alcohol. 
Officer: That's correct. 
H.O.: First of all, what brought your attention to the Gabbard vehicle, 
or the vehicle driven by Mr. Gabbard, I should say. 
Officer: I was in my car sitting at the, in the left turn lane, ah, 
southbound to go east on 45th. Ah, I observed another car 
northbound weaving in and out of traffic approaching 4500 South 
and I couldn't guess at his speed but he was passing most 
everything that was on the street. When he got to the red light 
at 4500 South and State Street he, ah, slammed on his brakes and 
he, he, ah, slid into the intersection, maybe as far as the first 
lane and then just continued through the red light. As he got 
through the intersection I made a "U" turn and got behind him. 
He then went from the far right hand lane, which was the lane 
that he was in when he went through the intersection, to the 
inside or the left lane and now traveling about 20 to 25 miles an 
hour. I followed him a block. He went into the left turn lane 
at about, I believe the intersection's 4295, and made a "U" turn 
and now he's going south on State Street and at which time Ie 
stopped him. 
H.O.: What led you to believe that he may be under ... 
Officer: Well... 
H.O.: ...driving under the influence of alcohol. 
Officer: As I walked up to the vehicle he rolled the window down and, ah, 
there was a very distinct odor of alcohol coming from the car. I 
asked him to step out. When he stepped out of the car he had to 
use the car to — he was leaning against the car with his left 
hand and there was an odor of alcohol about him and on his 
breath. His eyes were watery and, ah, basically it appeared to 
me at that time that he had been drinking alcohol. 
H.O.: Okay. How did you identify the driver? 
Officer: With his driver's license, Utah driver's license. 
H.O.: All right, what were the sequence of events from that point? 
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Officer: 
H.O.: 
Officer: 
H.O.: 
Officer: 
H.O.: 
Officer: 
H.O.: 
Officer: 
H.O.: 
Officer: 
I asked him if he had been drinking. He stated that he had had 
some to drink. I then asked him if he would take some field 
sobriety tests to see if he was able to operate a motor vehicle. 
And did you give some, or administer field sobriety tests? 
Yesf I did. 
And, ah, what conclusion did you draw? (Coughing) 
If I might look at ray — . Okay, on a couple of the tests he did 
fair, ah, on a couple. The two balance tests I asked him to just 
stand heel to toe while I explained what I wanted him to do and 
he had to step to the side several times. I asked him to stand 
on one foot and count to 30 out loud for me and he had to step 
off several times to maintain his balance, and it was my opinion 
at that time that he was under the influence of alcohol to the 
point where he couldn't operate a motor vehicle. 
Okay. How many tests did you give altogether? 
Four. 
So you're saying that two were okay and two weren't. 
Basically his, ah, when I just asked him to stand with his feet 
together and his head back he swayed slightly and I would say he 
did fair compared to some I've seen. When I asked him to walk 
heel to toe he, ah, the steps weren't all heel to toe. He did 
take the correct number of steps. When he turned to take the 
steps back he stumbled and, ah, when he did the, ah, — like I 
explained before the heel to toe just standing there he was 
unable to just stand heel to toe without stepping to the side to 
maintain his balance. 
You mean you're conclusions were then... 
That he was under the influence of alcohol which impaired his 
wmm 
ability to drive a car. 
H.O.: And what did you do about that? 
Officer: At that time I placed him under arrest for driving under the 
influence of alcohol. 
H.O.: Okay. Go over the sequence of events from that point. 
Officer: Ah, Deputy Dial had arrived on the scene and I asked him if he 
would conduct the intoxilyzer test. I'm not currently certified 
and he was driven over to Traffic Division where Deputy Dial 
administered the test. 
H.O.: Did you transport? 
Officer: Yes, I did. 
H.O.: Were you present during the testing procedure? 
Officer: Yes, I was. 
H.O.: What did you observe? 
Officer: Well, we — I had read him the, ah, request to take the breath 
test and the, ah, the, ah, statements about .08% would, ah, was 
above the legal limit and he could lose his driver's license, 
suspended or revocation of his driver's license and Deputy Dial 
conducted the intoxilyzer test. 
H.O.: Okay. Did Mr. Gabbard agree to the test? 
Officer: Yes, he did. 
H.O.: (Coughing) Do you have any questions, Lonnie? 
Att.: Well, I'm just going to ask — you indicated you watched Deputy 
Dial perform that intoxilyzer test. That is, what did you 
observe him do? 
Officer: Ah, well, not knowing that much about it, he went through the 
check list, ah, like I said I don't know that much about the 
intoxilyzer machine to tell you, you know, if it was done 
correctly or not, but, ah, he went through the check list. He 
read the, the, ah, whatever you want to call it, you know, what 
would occur, you know, with the chemical test as far as the 
driver's license suspension went. And, ah, did the test. 
Att.: You watched, you watched Mr. Gabbard blow into the machine. 
Officer: Yes, I did. 
Att.: You saw the results come out? 
Officer: Yeah. 
Att.: All right. Had you at any time prior to today, ah, seen Deputy 
Dial's certification? 
Officer: No. 
Att.: You presumed that he was certified at that time... 
Officer: To my best knowledge that he was certified. 
Att.: That's all. 
H.O.: Let me just get some clarification. Ah, you indicated that you 
weren't currently certified. Have you ever been certified? 
Officer: Yes, I have. 
H.O.: Okay, on an intoxilyzer? 
Officer: On the intoxilyzer and the breathalyzer. 
H.O.: Did it lapse or..? 
Officer: I was in vice for two and a half years and we never got to 
re-certify on it. So my certification lapsed. 
H.O.: Okay. 
Att.: Let me just ask a follow-up question on that. In that case the, 
ah, machine that you used out at the sub station is the CMI 4011 
ASA. Well, you wouldn't know that. 
Officer: (Laugh) It's a big box that says intoxilyzer on (Laughter). 
Att.: According to your report, referring to the operational check 
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Officer; 
Att.: 
Officer 2 
Att.: 
H.O.: 
Witness: 
listf I think that exhibit speaks for itself. That's an ASA 
check list. It's that right there that you got. When you were 
certified the only machines out at that time would have been, if 
it was two and a half years ago, would have been the 4011 and the 
4011A, is that true? - — -^ 
I think — it was — I was certified on that just as they were 
starting to put the intoxilyzer to use. 
All right. Have you seen the Commissioner of Public Safety's 
regulation that was published on this or the operating procedures 
published by CMI on the ASA? 
I've never seen them. 
That's all. 
Okay. (Cough) Deputy Dial, you've heard the testimony here of 
Deputy Beam, and he's already testified to the fact that, ah, ah, 
you were called or you appeared at the scene, ah, so let's start 
at that point. Ah, of the arrest, I should say. The scene of 
the arrest when I said the scene. Ah, let's begin at that point 
and can you tell me what you witnessed once you arrived. 
I arrived at the Currant's address, ah, and the, ah, Mr. Gabbard 
was being placed under arrest at the time. Ah, after he was 
being, after he had been placed under arrest, I checked his mouth 
following the Baker Ruling to insure that time would lapse from 
the time his mouth was checked and the time he blew into the 
machine. Ah, there was another individual in the vehicle which 
he had been stopped and a passenger — - normally we impound a 
vehicle. Well, in this case we were going to determine whether 
this individual could drive the vehicle away from the scene. So 
I conducted a couple of field sobriety tests on his passenger and 
it was determined by me that he was not impaired and that he 
could take the vehicle at that time. I responded to our traffic 
division, turned on the breathalyzer, and started my paper work. 
Deputy Beam arrived a few moments later. I am sure that the 
Baker Rule was followed to determine that the time had elapsed 
that is required. I am currently certified and was certified at 
that time. This is my certification card. 
Good until November. 
Correct. After conducting the, ah, intoxilyzer I took the check 
list, the test record, and the license of the arrestee and made 
three copies. One for Deputy Beam and two for the County 
Attorney and this used as well. Ah, I made those copies. 
Okay, ah, as you operated that particular machine, did you follow 
the nine steps? 
I did. 
And as you, ah, completed each of those steps — what do you do 
just check it off for...? 
Correct. As each step is completed I check it off and move on to 
the next step. At the time the machine was turned on was 2335. 
The time he blew into the machine was 2350. The time I checked 
his mouth would probably ten minutes prior to 2335, approximately 
10 minutes. I would estimate. 
Did you have any problems with the machine? 
No. 
What result? 
The results of the breath test were .14. 
Okay. Ah, I can't see any place on here other than the actual 
stamp, ah, what's the actual calibration of that machine, do you 
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know? 
Officer: 
H.O.: 
Att.: 
H.O.: 
Att.: 
H.O.: 
Att.: 
No. 
Question? I'm ready. 
I'll give you my good objection first. (Laughter) shopping list. 
(Laughter) All right? 
AJJ_r^t^______ 
No foundation for the breath results. You don't have a third 
digit. You don't know the calibration. Law requires you to be 
within .01./Ah, here's the shopping list now. 
Okay. 
Object to the admission of the affidavit (inaudible) request 
prior to this hearing nor are they certified or — certified 
copies pursuant to the rules of evidence or originals. Nor is 
there a supervisory affidavit per Murray vs Hall. Ahf even 
though Deputy Dial's here I will still object to the — since 
it's based upon the report. Since that is an item signed and 
subscribed to by Deputy Dial on the report not on the two 
exhibits, check list and the result. I'll object to their \^"~^ | 
admission on those grounds as well. Ah, and further — based 
upon tendings and unfamiliarity with the machine (inaudible) 
sufficient level to (inaudible). Ahf 41-6-44.3 which mandates 
the Commissioner's regulations or the manufacturer's regulations 
to follow. Copy here, if you take notice of the ASA regulations 
(inaudible) a deputy with a check list does not use the same II 
steps that the latest publication by Oil. (Inaudible) If you /1 
1
 / check with the Highway Patrol they'll tell you that they made 
H.O. 
those check lists differently. Couple of steps. 
What you're saying then is that the Sheriff's office made this up 
U 
and UHP made up a different plan. 
Att.: UHP is the samef I think. If everybody used the same one — for 
some reason they made a policy decision not to precisely follow 
those outlined by O H and I — and their experts will testify it 
doesn't make any difference. You get the same results. 
H.O.: Okay, now...(inaudible) 
Att.: (inaudible) It's a technical argument. 
H.O.: Okay, now I understand what you are saying. 
Att.: I'm saying the statute has to be followed. 
H.O.: Okay. 
Att.: Strictly. 
H.O.: Okay. All right. I understand what you're saying now. Ah, 
anything else? 
Att.: That's it. 
H.O.: All right. Of course I'll take everything into consideration 
before I make a decision, and, ah, it will probably be best to 
also notify your office because we don't for sure exactly what 
Mr. Gabbard's address is. 
Att.: Oh, I looked on my — I'm sure that one address is his home and 
the other one is his.. 
H.O.: Business? 
Att.: Business. 
H.O.: I think he used his business address when the old lady threw him 
out. 
Att.: Yeah, that's what he said. He says I'm living here now. 
(Laughter) 
H.O.: Well, with her friends now maybe he's back to 109 (inaudible) 
Att.: Yeah, he called me yesterday to see what the results of this 
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hearing were and I said, "I wouldn't be able to tell you that for 
another 24 hours." And he said, "Oh" and he was holding this in 
his hand and he said I just misread it. So I know he got it. 
But I think you can feel safe in sending it to the South Jordan 
address and if he doesn't get it I'll bear the responsibility of 
sending a copy anyway. 
H.O.: Sounds good. 
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TRANSCRIPTION CERTIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the Departmental Hearing of the matter of 
State of Utah versus Willis C. Gabbard, File Number 3842817 was 
electronically recorded by the Office of Driver License Services. 
That such recording was transcribed by me into typewriting; and 
that a true and correct transcription of said recording, to the best of 
my knowledge, is set forth in the foregoing pages. 
WITNESS MY HAND this 8th day of May 1985. 
W t - y 7 _ 3 7 UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
HIGHWAY SAFETY DIVISION 
OFFICE OF DRIVER LICENSE SERVICES 
SCOTT M. MATHESON 
Governor 
LARRY E. IUNNEN 
Comm»Mion»r 
WILLIS C GABBARD 
10955 SO 1300 WEST 
SO. JORDAN, UT. 84065 
DRIVER IMPROVEMENT SECTION 
4501 South 2700 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 
965-4437 
18 MARCH 1985 
ROBERT f. PARENT! 
Director 
FRED C SCHWENDIMAN, M91 
Driver license Services 
ORDER OF SUSPENSION 
LICENSE NUMBER 003842817 
BY AUTHORITY OF TITLE 41, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED THAT YOUR PRIVILEGE TO OPERATE A MOTOR 
VEHICLE ON THE HIGHWAYS OF THIS STATE IS SUSPENDED FOR A 
PERIOD OF 3 MONTHS EFFECTIVE 24 MARCH 1985. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT YOU IMMEDIATELY SURRENDER TO THIS 
DEPARTMENT YOUR UTAH DRIVER LICENSE NUMBER 003842817 AND 
ALL OTHER DRIVER LICENSES ISSUED TO YOU. 
THE AUTHORITY FOR SUCH ACTION IS U.C.A. 41-2-19.6 AND THAT 
A PEACE OFFICER HAD REASONABLE GROUNDS TO BELIEVE YOU HAD 
BEEN OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE IN VIOLATION OF U.C.A. 
41-6-44 (DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE LAW). 
UTAH LAW REQUIRES ANY PERSON WHOSE UTAH DRIY1NG PRIVILEGE 
HAS BEEN SUSPENDED OR REVOKED TO PAY A $25.00 FEE FOLLOWING 
THE REVOCATION OR SUSPENSION PERIOD TO HAVE THIS PRIVILEGE 
REINSTATED. IN ADDITION TO THE REINSTATEMENT FEE, A $25.00 
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE FEE WILL BE ASSESSED WHEN THE 
PRIVILEGE TO DRIVE HAS BEEN ADMINISTRATIVELY SUSPENDED FOR 
BEING ARRESTED FOR DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE. 
IF YOU HAVE NOT VOLUNTARILY SURRENDERED UPON DEMAND ALL 
LICENSES AND PERMITS AND A PICKUP ORDER HAS BEEN ISSUED FOR 
THESE ITEMS, AN ADDITIONAL $25.00 FEE WILL BE ASSESSED AT 
THE TIME OF REINSTATEMENT. 
IT IS A MISDEMEANOR TO 
HIGHWAYS OF THIS STATE 
SUSPENDED OR REVOKED. 
OPERATE ANY MOTOR VEHICLE UPON THE 
WHILE YOUR DRIVER LICENSE IS 
YOU MAY APPEAL THIS ACTION IN A COURT OF RECORD IN THE 
COUNTY CF YOUR RESIDENCE WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS. 
DATED AT SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, THIS 18TH DAY OF MARCH 1985, 
85 cc: Loni F. DeLand 
Attorney at Law 
132 S. 600 E. 
S.L.C. UT 84102 
VERY TRULY YOURS, 
DAVID A. BEACH, BUREAU CHIEF 
DRIVER LICENSE SERVICES 
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EXHIBIT D 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-85-2219 
vs. : 
DAVID A. BEACH, Bureau : 
Chief, Driver License 
Services, : 
Respondent. : 
Petitioner, Willis C. Gabbard, appeals from the respondent's 
decision suspending his driving privileges for 90 days. This 
matter came on for hearing this date. The Court received the 
transcript of the hearing, along with pertinent documents, including 
the report of the hearing of the administrative officer, two 
affidavits of breath test technicians, the DUI Summons and Citation, 
DUI Report Form of the arresting officer, Intoxilyzer Test Record 
and Checklist, and miscellaneous correspondence, including the 
Order of Suspension, dated March 18, 1985, effective March 24, 
1985, and mailed to the petitioner on April 4, 1985. 
Petitioner claims that the actions of respondent were arbitrary 
and capricious in that there was insufficient evidence to support 
the findings of the examiner, and that the Order of Suspension 
was prepared and dated March 18, 1985 (four days prior to the 
hearing date.) 
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Section 41-2-19.6 of Utah Code Ann. provides that a peace 
officer who has reasonable grounds to believe a driver is in 
violation of Section 41-6-44 has a right to request a chemical 
test be performed for blood/alcohol. If the blood/alcohol is 
found to be .08% or more, or if the officer makes a determination, 
based upon reasonable grounds, that the person is otherwise 
in violation of Section 41-6-44, the officer may take the driver's 
license and issue a temporary license good for 30 days. 
Section 41-6-44.5 provides that chemical tests taken within 
two hours of the alleged driving shall be presumed to be "not 
less" than the level of alcohol determined to be in the blood 
by the chemical test itself. 
Section 41-6-44.3 provides that the commissioner of public 
safety shall establish standards for the administration and 
interpretation of chemical analysis and standards for training. 
Documents proving that the analysis was made and the instrument 
was accurate in accordance with the commissioner's standards 
are admissible into evidence if the judge finds that such documents 
indicating the same were made in the regular course of investigation, 
at or about the time of the act, condition or event, and the 
source of the information from which the document was made indicate 
trustworthiness. 
In the case at bar affidavits of Stan Jensen indicate that 
the equipment in question was tested in accordance with standards 
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established by the commissioner of public safety and passed 
such test indicating the instrument was working properly. One 
such test occurred prior to the arrest in question, and the 
other test subsequent thereto. 
The Intoxilyzer Test Record indicates that nine items were 
checked on the Operational Checklist. This would indicate that 
the intoxilyzer machine was operated in accordance with the 
nine requirements set forth on the Operational Checklist. However, 
there was no evidence as to whether or not this checklist complies 
with standards set forth by the commissioner of public safety. 
Also, there is no testimony as to the meaning of the calibrating 
reading of .24%. There is testimony, however, by the operator 
of the machine to the effect that it was working properly without 
problem at the time of testing. 
The investigating officer, T. J. Beam testified at the 
hearing of his observations of petitioner. He testified that 
he observed the petitioner "weaving in and out of traffic" ap-
proaching 4500 South, and "passing most everything that was 
on the street." He testified the petitioner slammed on his 
brakes and slid into the intersection through a red light, and 
then continued through the red light, and continued for a block 
wherein he made a U-turn. It was at this point the officer 
stopped him. 
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He detected a "very distinct odor of alcohol coming from 
the car" and from the petitioner as he stepped out of his car. 
The petitioner's eyes were watery. It appeared to the officer 
that petitioner "had been drinking alcohol." Based upon his 
observations, including the results of field sobriety tests, 
he concluded that petitioner was under the influence of alcohol 
which impaired his ability to drive a car. 
Deputy Dial testified that in performing the intoxilyzer 
test, he followed the prescribed nine steps and had no problems 
with the machine. The test results indicated .14% blood/alcohol. 
The arresting officer's DUI Report Form included information 
that the petitioner was driving "at a high rate of speed approaching 
the red light" when he put on his brakes and skidded through 
the intersection. The driver stated he had consumed three rum 
and cokes, and three beers, the first drink being consumed at 
8:30 or 9:00 o'clock, and the last drink five minutes before 
being stopped by the police. This Report was signed February 
22, 1985 at 02:30 a.m., and was notarized. It was also endorsed 
by the signature of the chief of police or the equivalent, Dee 
A. Kartchner. 
The question on appeal is whether or not there was a residuum 
of evidence before the hearing examiner upon which he could 
reasonably base his decision. In this regard, there was sufficient 
testimony that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds 
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to believe that the petitioner was in violation of Section 41-6-44, 
even without the blood/alcohol test. However, the Court believes 
there was enough evidence to indicate the machine was working 
in accordance with standards of the commissioner, and enough 
evidence to imply that the test was administered in accordance 
with standards of the commissioner. 
The actions of the hearing examiner in suspending the peti-
tioner's driver's license are affirmed. 
Counsel for defendant will prepare the Order in accordance 
with this Memorandum Decision. 
Dated this £-( day of May, 1985. 
kl LeorxartL &. £uss&r\ 
LEONARD H. RUSSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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I h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t I m a i l e d a t r u e a n d c o r r e c t c o p y 
o f t h e f o r e g o i n g Memorandum D e c i s i o n , p o s t a g e p r e p a i d , t o t h e 
f o l l o w i n g t h i s day of May, 1 9 8 5 : 
Loni F. DeLand 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIS C. GABBARD, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, Chief, 
Driver License Services, 
Department of Public Safety, 
State of Utah, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
Case No. C-85-2219 
Judge Leonard H. Russon 
This matter having come before the Court on May 21, 
1985, and the parties being represented by their respective 
counsel and the Court having received and reviewed the record of 
the Department of Public Safety, State of Utah and adminis-
trative hearing in the above-entitled matter, and plaintiff's 
complaint alleging that the Office of Driver License Services was 
arbitrary and capricious under the Utah Operator's License Act, 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-2-19.6 and 41-2-20, the Court being fully 
apprised in the premises now makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that the evidence and the agency 
record preponderates that there is substantial and competent 
evidence to support the findings of the hearing officer of the 
Department of Public Safety. There was sufficient testimony that 
the arresting officer had cause to stop and probable cause to 
arrest/ did arrest and had reasonable grounds to believe that 
petitioner was in violation of Section 41-6-44, even without the 
blood alcohol test to establish a residuum of evidence, upon 
which the hearing officer could reasonably base his decision. 
The Court finds that the preponderance of the evidence is that 
the intoxlizer machine was working in accordance with the 
standards of the Commissioner of Public Safety, and the chemical 
breath test was administered in accordance with the standards of 
the Commissioner. 
2. The Court further finds that all of the elements of 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-19.6 were proven before the Agency. The 
Court specifically finds that the evidence before the Agency is 
competent and preponderates that the arresting officer had 
reasonable grounds to believe that plaintiff may have been in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44, when he observed him 1) 
weaving in and out of traffic, 2) driving at a high rate of speed 
as he approached a stop light, then applying his brakes and 
skidding through the intersection, 3) and detected a distinct 
odor of alcohol emanating from the car as well as the 
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petitioner's person. The petitioner was then arrested, and was 
requested to take an intoxilyzer test, and advised that a result 
indicating a blood alcohol content, by weight, of .08% or more 
shall and can result in the suspension or revocation of the 
person's license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle, that a 
chemical test was voluntarily agreed to by plaintiff, and that it 
was properly given by a certified operator showing reliably a 
result of .08% or above of alcohol by weight in plaintiff's 
blood. 
3. The Court further finds that the DUI report was 
properly signed, notarized, countersigned and forwarded to the 
Office of Driver License Services within five days of the arrest, 
that plaintiff requested a timely hearing which was held by an 
unbiased Hearing Officer with the plaintiff, as well as the 
officer, offering sworn testimony. 
4. The hearing was granted prior to 30 days from the 
date of the arrest, and the statute grants the plaintiff due 
process and the opportunity to appeal to this Court for a hearing 
on the record and a determination of whether or not the 
Department was arbitrary or capricious. 
5* The arresting officer gave sworn testimony before 
the Department to the contents of the DUI Report Form. The Court 
finds that the officer who administered the brbath test with the 
intoxilyzer was certified, that he used a checklist and had no 
problems with the machine. The intoxilyzer was therefore 
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properly presumed to be reliable and in working order and the 
results were admissible before the Administrative Department 
without further foundation as official records of the Department 
of Public Safety. 
6. Pursuant to § 41-2-19.6 the plaintiff's license was 
suspended. The plaintiff appealed that adverse decision to this 
Court for a review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-2-19.6 and 
41-2-20. 
7. The Court adopts the memorandum decision issued by 
the Court on the 21st day of May, and it's supplement of May 29, 
1985, in the above-entitled matter. 
Having made the foregoing findings of fact, the Court 
now makes its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court concludes that there was substantial 
competent evidence to support the Department's determination to 
sustain the Notice of Intention to Suspend plaintiff's privilege 
to operate a vehicle in the State of Utah served upon plaintiff 
when he was arrested and due process was granted. 
2. There was competent evidence to support the 
Administrative findings, and the Court concludes that the 
arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe th#t the 
plaintiff may have been in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44, 
and that there were reliable test results which indicated a 
blood alcohol content of .08% or greater in the plaintiff, or 
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that the plaintiff had been operating a motor vehicle under the 
influence of alcohol rendering him incapable of safely driving 
the same. 
3. The Court concludes that the intoxilyzer machine 
was reliable and the results admissible before the Department, 
pursuant to the presumption set forth in Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-
44.5 and 44.3, and Murray City v. Hall. 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 
1983) . 
4. The Court further concludes that, under the defini-
tions of arbitrary and capricious given in Utah Department of 
Administrative Services v« Public Service Commission/ 658 p.2d 
601, the Department of Public Safety's decision was not arbitrary 
or capricious. 
The Court having made the foregoing findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, now makes the following: 
ORDER 
1. The decision of the Department of Public Safety, 
Office of Driver License Services, is sustained and plaintiff's 
driving privileges are to be suspended or revoked as required by 
law. , 
DATED this / day of c )U/U , 1985. 
'sonnr* JT//^5d)?] 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of 
the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, 
first class postage prepaid, to the following on this day 
of June, 1985: 
Loni F. DeLand 
Attorney at Law 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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41-2-19.6 MOTOR VEHICLES 
sections 41-2-29 and 41-2-30, Utah Code amended by chapter 2, Laws of Utah 1980, 
Annotated 1953, as last amended by chapter section 73-18-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
83, Laws of Utah 1967, section 41-6-43.10, af3 last amended by chapter 183, Laws of 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last amended Lftah 1977, and section 76-5-207, Utah Code 
by chapter 78, Laws of Utah 1957, section Annotated 1953, as last amended by chapter 
41-6-44, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last g^ L a w s 0f u t a n 1981, enacts sections 
amended by chapter 46 Laws of Utah 1982,
 4l_2-19.5 and 41-2-19 6, Utah Code Annotated 
sections 41-6-44.3 and 41-6-44.5, Utah Code
 1 9 „ . reDGals a n d r e e n a c t s s e c t l o n 41-6-43 
Annotated 1953, as enacted by chapter 243, Jf3' 'epfalsA a n ° "*"*£,, s e C t l 0 n , ,b t 
Laws of Utah 1979, section 41-6-44.10, Utah Htah C o d e Annotated 1953, as enacted by 
Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by chapter 4aPter 242> L a w s o f U t a h 1979^ a n d r eP e a l s 
126, Laws of Utah 1981, section 41-22-14, section 41-6-44.2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by a? last amended by chapter 4, Laws of Utah 
chapter 107, Laws of Utah 1971, section 1982, Second Special Session - Laws 1983, 
63-43-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last cji. 99. 
41-2-19.6. Chemical test — Grounds and procedure for officer's request — 
Taking license — Report to department — Procedure by department — Sus-
pension. (1) When a peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person 
may be violating or has violated section 41-6^44 the peace officer may, in connection 
with his arrest of the person, request the person to submit to a chemical test to 
be administered in compliance with the standards set forth in section 41-6-44.10. 
(2) The peace officer shall advise a person prior to the person's submission to 
a chemical test that results indicating .08% or more by weight of alcohol in the 
blood shall, and the existence of a blood alcohol content sufficient to render the 
person incapable of safely driving a vehicle can, result in suspension or revocation 
of the person's license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle. 
(3) If the person submits to that chemical test and the results indicate a blood 
alcohol content of .08% or more, or if the officer makes a determination, based on 
reasonable grounds to believe that the determination is correct, that the person 
is otherwise in violation of section 41-6-44, the officer directing administration of 
the test or making the determination shall serve on the person, on behalf of the 
department, immediate notice of the department's intention to suspend the person's 
privilege or license to drive. If the officer serves that immediate notice on behalf 
of the department he shall take the Utah driver license or certificate or permit, 
if any, of the driver, issue a temporary license effective for only 30 days, and supply 
to the driver, on a form to be approved tyy the department, basic information 
regarding how to obtain a prompt hearing before the department. A citation issued 
by the officer may, if approved as to form by the department, serve also as the 
temporary license. 
(4) The peace officer serving the notice shall send to the department within five 
days after the date of arrest and service of the notice the person's license along 
with a copy of the citation issued regarding the offense, and a sworn report indicat-
ing the chemical test results, if any, and any other basis for the officer's determina-
tion that the person has violated section 41-6-44, and the officer's belief regarding 
the person's violation of section 41-6-44. fiach such report shall be on a form 
approved by the department and shall be endorsed by the police chief or his equiva-
lent or by a person authorized by him, other tjhan the officer serving the notice. 
(5) Upon written request of a person wh0 has been issued a 30-day license, the 
department shall grant to the person an opportunity to be heard within 30 days 
after the date of arrest and issuance of the 30-day license, but the request must 
be made within 10 days of the date of the arrest and issuance of the 30-day license. 
A hearing, if held, shall be before the department in the county in which the arrest 
occurred, unless the department and the person agree that the hearing may be held 
in some other county. The hearing shall be documented and its scope shall cover 
the issues of whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person 
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OPERATORS' LICENSE ACT 41-2-21 
to have been operating a motor vehicle in violation of section 41-6-44, whether the 
person refused to submit to the test, and the test results, if any. In connection 
with a hearing the department or its duly authorized agent may administer oaths 
and may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the production of 
relevant books and papers. One or more members of the department may conduct 
the hearing, and any decision made after a hearing before any number of the mem-
bers of the department shall be as valid as if made after a hearing before the full 
membership of the department. After the hearing, the department shall order, 
either that the person's license or privilege to drive be suspended or that it not 
be suspended. A first suspension, whether ordered or not challenged under this sub-
section, shall be for a period of 90 days, beginning on the 31st day after the date 
of the arrest. A second or subsequent suspension under this subsection shall be 
for a period of 120 days, beginning on the 31st day after the date of arrest. The 
department shall assess against a person, in addition to any fee imposed under 
subsection 41-2-8(7), a fee of $25, which must be paid before the person's driving 
privilege is reinstated, to cover administrative costs, and which fee shall be can-
celled if the person obtains an unappealled department-hearing or court decision 
that the suspension was not proper. A person whose license has been suspended 
by the department under this subsection may file a petition within 30 days after 
the suspension for a hearing in the matter which, if held, shall be governed by 
the provisions of section 41-2-20. 
History: C. 1953, 41-2-19.6, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 99, § 6. 
41-2-20. Judicial review of license cancellation, revocation or suspension 
— Scope of review. Any person denied a license or whose license has been can-
celed, suspended or revoked by the department except where such cancellation or 
revocation is mandatory under the provisions of this act unless the suspension 
occurred pursuant to section 41-2-19.6 shall have the right to file a petition within 
thirty days thereafter for a hearing in the matter in a court of record in the county 
wherein such person shall reside and such court is hereby vested with jurisdiction 
and it shall be its duty to set the matter for hearing upon ten days' written notice 
to the department; and thereupon to take testimony #nd examine 4»to -the facts 
Or tile CaSC and to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to a license or ta 
subject to cancellation, suspension or revocation of license under -the provisions -of 
fckio aet. The court's jurisdiction is limited to a review of the record to determine 
whether or not the department's decision was arbitrary or capricious. 
History: L. 1933, ch. 45, § 20; 1935, ch. 47, 
§ 2; C. 1943, 57-4-23; L. 1983, ch. 99, § 7. 
41-2-21. New license after revocation. (1) Any person whose license has been 
revoked under this act shall not be entitled to apply for or receive any new license 
until the expiration of one year from the date such former license was revoked 
or longer as provided in sections 41-2-18 and 41-2-19. Licenses which have been 
revoked may not be renewed, but application for a new license must be filed as 
provided in section 41-2-8, and a license so issued shall be subject to all of the 
provisions of an original license. The department shall not grant the license until 
an investigation of the character, abilities and habits of the driver has been made 
to indicate whether it will be safe to again grant him the privilege of using the 
highways. 
(2) Any resident or nonresident whose operator's or chauffeur's license to oper-
ate a motor vehicle in this state has been suspended or revoked as provided in this 
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act shall not operate a motor vehicle in this state under a license, permit, or regis-
tration certificate issued by any other jurisdiction or otherwise during such suspen-
sion or after such revocation until a new ljcense is obtained when and as permitted 
under this act. 
History: L. 1933, ch. 45, § 21; 1935, ch. 47, 
§ 2; 1941, ch. 51, § 2; C. 1943, 57-4-24; L. 1967, 
ch. 82, § 12; 1983, ch. 183, § 23. 
41-2-22. Owner liable for negligence of minor. 
Actions by automobile owner against third shield against actions brought by the auto-
party, mobile owner against third parties for dam-
The negligence of the minor is not imputed age to the owner's automobile; comparative 
to the automobile owner and this section negligence statutes do not change such rule. 
does not provide a third party a statutory Otto v. Leany (1981) 635 P 2d 410. 
41-2-23. Violation of license provisions. It shall be unlawful for any person 
to commit any of the following acts: 
F i r s t (1) To display or cause or permit to be displayed or to have in possession 
any operator's or chauffeur's license knowing the same to be fictitious or to have 
been canceled, revoked, suspended or altered; 
Second. (2) To lend to, or knowingly permit the use of, by one not entitled 
thereto, any operator's or chauffeur's license issued to the person so lending or per-
mitting the use thereof; 
Third. (3) To display or to represent as one's own any operator's or chauffeur'9 
license not issued to the person so displaying the same; 
Fourth. (4) To fail or refuse to surrender to the department upon demand, any 
operator's or chauffeur's license which has been suspended, canceled or revoked as 
provided by law; 
Fifth. (5) To use a false or fictitious name or give a false or fictitious address 
in any application for an operator's or chauffeur's license, or any renewal or dupli-
cate thereof, or knowingly to make a false statement or knowingly to conceal a 
material fact or otherwise commit a fraud in any such application. 
History: L. 1933, ch. 45, §24; C. 1943, 
57-4-27; L. 1983, ch. 183, § 24. 
41-2-23.5. Confiscation of licenses, plates, and registration cards — Con-
tracts with law enforcement agencies for pick-up orders — Additional fee to 
cover costs. (1) The department is hereby authorized to enter into contractual 
agreements with constables or other law enforcement agencies for the purpose of 
facilitating confiscation of operator's and chauffeur's licenses, license or registra-
tion plates, and registration cards when a person fails or refuses to surrender any 
of those documents to the department upon demand. 
(2) The department shall assess against a person making an application 
referred to in subsection 41-2-8(7), in addition to any fee imposed under subsection 
41-2-8(7), a fee of $25, which must be paid before the person's driving privilege 
is reinstated, to cover the costs required to serve orders related to the purposes 
of subsection (1). 
History: C. 1953, 41-2-23.5, enacted by L. into contractual agreements with law 
1983, ch. 191, § 1. enforcement agencies for the purpose of 
facilitating confiscation of license-privilege 
1 ltle of Act. Jndicia; and providing an effective date. 
An act relating to motor vehicles; authoriz-
ing the department of public safety to enter 
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W (8) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation 
of this section when sad* the violation is coupled with an accident or collision in 
which streh the person is involved and when s«ek the violation has, in fact, been 
committed, although not in his presence, if the officer has reasonable cause to 
believe that the violation was committed by st*ek the person. 
(t) (9) The department of public safety shall revoke suspend for a period of 90 
days the operator's or chauffeur^ license of any person convicted~7or the first "time 
under subsection (1) of this section^ and shall revoke for one year the* license of 
any person otherwise convicted underIHTs section, except that the department may 
subtract from any suspensiorTperiod the number of daysTor which a license was 
previously suspended under section 41-2-19.6 if the previous suspension was based 
on the same occurrence which the record of conviction is based upoZ 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, §34, C 1943, 
57-7-111, L. 1949, ch 65, § 1, 1957, ch. 75, § 1, 
1967, ch. 88, § 2; 1969, ch 107, § 2; 1977, ch. 
268, § 3; 1979, ch. 243, § 1, 1981, ch 63, § 2, 
1982, ch. 46, § 1, 1983, ch. 99, § 13; 1983, ch. 
103, § 1; 1983, ch. 183, § 33. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Laws 1983, ch 183, discontinuing separate 
classification for chauffeur's license, is effec-
tive January 1, 1984 
The 1982 amendment increased the mini-
mum term in subsec (d) from 30 to 60 days, 
deleted "not less than $100 nor more than" 
before "$299" in subsec (d), inserted subsec 
(e), redesignated former subsec (e) as (f), 
increased the period of work from not less 
than two nor more than 10 days to not less 
41-6-44.2. Repealed. 
Repeal. 
Section 41-6-44 2 (L 1973, ch 80, § 2; 1982 
(2nd S S.), ch. 4, § 2), relating to driving with 
41-6-44.3. Standards for chemical breath analysis — Evidence. (1) The com-
missioner of public safety shall establish standards for the administration and 
interpretation of chemical analysis of a person's breath including standards of 
training. 
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that a person 
was driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol or driving with a blood alcohol content of .10% of greater statutorily pro-
hibited, documents offered as memoranda or records of acts, conditions or events 
to prove that the analysis was made and accuracy of the instrument were made 
pursuant to used was accurate, according to standards established in subsection 
(1) shall be admissible if: 
(a) The judge finds that they were made in the regular course of the investiga-
tion at or about the time of the act, condition or event; and 
(b) The source of information from which made and the method and circum-
stances of their preparation were such as to indicate their trustworthiness. 
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under subsection (1) and 
the provisions conditions of subsection (2) have been met, there sk&& be is a pre-
sumption that the test results are valid and further foundation for introduction 
of the evidence is unnecessary. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.3, enacted by L. 
1979, ch. 243, § 2; L. 1983, ch. 99, § 14. 
than 10 nor more than 30 days in the first 
sentence of subsec. (f), added "or to obtain 
treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facil-
ity" to the first sentence of subsec (f), 
increased the periods in the second sentence 
of subsec. (f) from not less than 10 nor more 
than 30 days to not less than 30 nor more 
than 90 days, added "plus obtain treatment 
at an alcohol rehabilitation faciht>" to the 
second sentence of subsec (f), inserted 
subsec. (g), redesignated former subsecs (f) 
and (g) as (h) and (i) 
Effective Date. 
Section 2 of Laws 1982, ch 46 provided 
that the act should take effect upon approval 
Approved February 19, 1982 
blood alcohol content of 10% or higher, was 
repealed by Laws 1983, ch 99, § 21. 
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